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             Precis of When Truth Gives Out 
 
   
Mainstream accounts of meaning have either truth conditional 
semantics or the assignment of truth bearing propositions to sentences as 
their primary goal. When Truth Gives Out (WT, henceforth) argues that 
while giving truth conditions and assigning truth bearers to sentences and 
mental states plays a role in an account of meaning, important aspects of 
meaning are not explained in such terms.  It argues further that when we 
invoke truth conditions or truth bearers in an account of meaning, we must 
employ a non-standard notion of truth, on which truth is relative to both a 
possible world and something contributed by human interests – a 
perspective, a set of standards for applying our concepts, or the like. 
WT's first three chapters look at some of the ways in which the 
performative aspects of our talk –what we do with our words –bear on 
whether and when our talk should or can be evaluated in terms of truth.  
Chapter 1 argues that talk involving racial slurs may be truth valueless as a 
result of its performative dimension.  The chapter begins with a puzzle: On 
the one hand, racial epithets seem to have clear application conditions.  It is 
a linguistic mistake to call a Frenchman a 'limey.'  This makes it seem that 
slurs must be true of their targets.  On the other hand, if someone slurs in 
saying something --a bigot says ‘a [slur] lives in that building’ --we do not 
want to say that what was said is true.  For if I think what the bigot said is 
true, I think that a [slur] lives in the building. Most of us do not believe that 
sort of thing. 
To resolve the puzzle, we need to accept that the performative and 
expressive aspects of slurring are just as much components of the “sense” of     2   
the slur as is the fact that the slur is used to classify a certain group.  Because 
of this,  thinking of someone as a *, * a slur on people of kind K, is thinking 
of him in a different way than thinking of him as a K.  Furthermore, the 
performative and expressive aspects of a slur involve representation, but 
represent differently than other words.  For one way to represent someone as 
contemptible is to show contempt for them, just as one way to represent 
something as deserving of fear is to be afraid of it.  Thus, slurring thoughts 
not only express contempt, they represent their targets through such 
contempt as contemptible because of their ethnicity or race.  They therefore 
misrepresent them, as no one is contemptible for that reason.  So these 
thoughts are not true.  But they are not therefore false.  If they were, we 
could adjust the mistake made in an utterance of if Bob married  a *, he’s 
unhappy simply by pointing out that though Bob married a *, he’s quite 
happy.   But we can’t do this, because making this last claim is still 
displaying contempt and thus (mis) representing.  The upshot is that slurring 
speech, though expressing beliefs and (mis)representing the world, is simply 
not truth evaluable.  It involves error and must therefore be rejected.  But to 
say this is not to say that what the racist says is false. 
Slurs can sometimes be used without the user being liable to censure. 
This raises the question of whether the evaluative and performative elements 
associated with slurs are essential to their meanings and to the thoughts 
expressed with them.  The same question arises for other "thick terms": Do 
we change such a term’s meaning when we succeed in using it without taint 
of its conventional evaluative dimension?  Chapter 1 essays the beginning of 
an answer to such questions, defending a view of word meaning and concept 
individuation on which whether something is part of a concept or of a 
word’s meaning depends as much on contextual and social factors operative     3   
in the context in which questions about the meaning or concept are asked, as 
it does on context independent factors. 
Chapter 2 begins with the following puzzle.  Sometimes, when we 
talk about talk –when, for example, we talk about paradoxical sentences 
such as the liar –we seem to “get things right”, but our getting it right can’t 
be a matter of our saying something true.  A liar sentence is, of course, not 
true –that’s something we can prove, and we thus know.   Something similar 
holds of  the claim that applications of vague predicates to their borderline 
cases are without truth value.  If Jo is a borderline case of baldness, it seems 
it’s not true that he’s bald, and not true that he’s not.   And it seems to pretty 
much everyone that Jo’s bald iff it’s true that he’s bald.  But contradiction 
ensues if all these things are true. 
  Chapters 2  and 3 develop the idea that there are more ways to “get 
things right” than simply by asserting something –that is, by committing to a 
claim's truth.  One can, for example, deny the claim that the liar is true, 
where denial is understood as sui generis and not reducible to assertion of a 
negation; denying p is apt iff p is not true –that is, false or without truth 
value.
1  If we see connectives like ‘not’ as sometimes contributing to the 
sense of what one says with a sentence, sometimes acting as "force 
indicators" –conveying information about the act being performed –we can 
make sense of the idea that  someone could “get it right” without speaking 
the truth.  
  Frege famously objected to this idea; Geach famously extended 
Frege's objection to the view that (for example) normative sentences are not 
in the business of enabling assertion. Chapters 2 and 3 of WT make three 
                                                 
1 As such, denial of p is not assertion of p's negation, since the latter is not apt when p is 
truth valueless.     4   
points.  (1) One kind of expressivist semantics has a straightforward 
response to the Frege-Geach problem; (2) this semantics helps explain how 
we can correctly say that a sentence or claim is neither true nor false, and 
thus affords some insight into vagueness and semantic paradox; (3) it also 
provides a response to worries that expressivist and emotivist accounts of 
evaluative language can’t give a coherent account of negation, disjunction, 
and the like. 
  The semantics is based on three assumptions.  (1) Simple sentences 
are conventional means for expressing mental attitudes (like belief, valuing, 
and being (morally) tolerant) and performing speech acts (like assertion and 
denial). (2) These mental states and speech acts involve commitments.  
Belief and assertion commit one to the truth of what is believed; valuing X 
commits one to X’s being valuable.  These commitments, in turn, have 
aptness conditions:  commitment to p’s truth is apt provided p is true; 
valuing x is apt provided x is valuable; toleration is apt provided what is 
tolerated is tolerable.   This means that associated with the simplest 
sentences of our language are a mental attitude, an associated commitment, 
and the aptness conditions of the commitment.
2  (3) For semantic purposes, 
we may blur the distinction between a commitment and its aptness 
conditions.   An expressivist semantics ought compositionally assign 
commitments represented in terms of their aptness conditions to sentences; 
in particular, it should treat sentence compounding devices as expressions 
whose meanings map commitments-represented-via-their-aptness-conditions 
to commitments.  In doing this, the semantics makes clear how sentences are 
related to speech acts and mental states: a sentence is a conventional means 
                                                 
2 Of course the commitment associated with a sentence may vary across contexts if the 
sentence has contextually sensitive vocabulary.  I ignore this sort of thing when sensible.       5   
for expressing a mental state S or performing act A provided that the 
characteristic commitment of S or A is the semantic value of the sentence.  
Doing this and defining validity as preservation of commitments allows us to 
respond to Frege and Geach. 
The material in Chapters 2 and 3 seems to me relevant to questions 
about how much of the semantics of a language one can do in the language 
itself.  In an appendix, I discuss an extension of the language of Chapter 2 to 
one which contains its own Kripkean truth predicate, as well as a predicate 
which characterizes appropriateness of the commitments that can be incurred 
by using the language's sentences. 
The second half of the book takes up relativism about truth and the 
status of opinions about “matters of taste”. By relativism, I mean the view 
that what we say or think is at least sometimes true only relative to 
something determined by the interests or standards of thinkers.  One goal of 
Chapter 4 is to show that pedestrian facts about when we judge people to 
disagree, along with widely accepted views about how the interests of 
speakers effect the interpretations of their words, entail relativism.  A second 
goal is to argue that relativism, in and of itself, is a relatively benign view –
accepting it, even as true of the majority of claims we make, does not require 
that we allow that any opinion is as good as any other, or that when a claim 
is “true for me, false for you”, there cannot be reasoned argument between 
us, or even good reason for one of us to come around to the other’s opinion.   
We do not have to embrace an “absolute” notion of truth simply because we 
want to insist that some views are wildly unreasonable, or that there is often 
or even usually a best way to think about a matter. 
Pretty much everyone allows that gradable adjective (such as ‘rich’, 
‘red’, ‘rotund’, and ‘religious’) vary in extension across different contexts     6   
with the interests and purposes of conversants.  David Lewis famously and 
convincingly argued that conversational “rules” and processes (such as 
“accommodation”) demand such variation.  But we very often take people in 
different contexts, contexts with different standards for applying such 
adjectives, to have a genuine disagreement –as when, say, Naomi and her 
blue collar friends think the million dollar lottery winner to be rich, Didi and 
her blue blooded friends think that such a person is obviously not rich.  But 
if they disagree, they are saying the same thing with ‘Mary is rich’; if 
application varies with context, each speaks truly. 
After exploring some ways of trying to non-relativistically reconcile 
these facts and finding them wanting, I sketch a version of relativism which 
makes sense of them.  On it, truth is something a claim sometimes has only 
relative to the standards conversatants adopt or presuppose.  None of the 
standard charges of incoherence directed at relativism apply to this view –
it’s not self defeating (it is not relatively true), it doesn’t entail that there are 
“true contradictions”.   And quite plausible views of the nature of concepts –
ones which ground concept identity (partially) in such things as functional 
roles, “partial definitions”, or a “core extension” and a prototype structure –
provide a natural model of thought and meaning on which such  relativism is 
to be expected.  
A likely place to look for relative truth, it seems, is in matters of taste.  
Our detailed conceptions of who is handsome, what is hip, what perverted –
these typically differ.  And at the end of the day, my judgment of who is 
sexy, hip, or perverted seems to answer to my considered opinions on the 
matter; likewise for yours.  But we nonetheless will argue about whether 
someone is sexy, whether a certain activity is perverted –we take ourselves     7   
to disagree, and think the disagreement (sometimes) worth argument.  And 
this sounds like a setting in which genuine relativism might flourish. 
Chapter 5 of WT sketches a expressivist alternative to relativist 
accounts of judgments of taste.  It gives an account of an expressivist 
account of 'faultless disagreement', discusses how to understand ascription of 
possibility and necessity to taste claims, and offers arguments against 
contextualist accounts that say we should understand predicates like 'is tasty' 
as having an implicit 'judge argument', so that (for example) typical uses of 
'that is tasty' say what is said by something of the from that is tasty to so and 
so. 
 
 